Young Solo Sailors

A conversation sprang up here last night. My 22 year-old son said that he thought it was inappropriate that young people set off to sail solo around the world. Certainly at the age of 16. I told him he was a conservative old fart!

It got me thinking however. What are the rights and wrongs of allowing or more correctly supporting your child to go off and do something like this? Is it dangerous? Is it foolhardy? I came to a split decision and here it is.

Firstly I think many of the issues which kids face today have, at their root, the fact that we don't challenge our kids enough. I mean that kids don't face physical and mental challenges and they don't face controlled danger. Somebody described the kids of today as leading meaningless and insipid lives. I believe that that's true to a large extent. I also think that leads to kids seeking out their own challenges - often inappropriate challenges like violence and drinking.

The problem for parents, teachers and others is this: as soon as you support your children to take on challenges and risks you begin to worry!! It's inevitable, you care, you feel responsible and you worry. My personal view is that the worry is part of your job as a parent...it's your responsibility to work with your children to try and make sure that the risks are proportional and that they are equipped to manage them. It isn't your job to stop them taking those risks. Indeed as they get older the notion of "stopping" your children from doing something becomes simply irrelevant. They'll find a way. So you are much better being part of the process than a powerless bystander.

In short that means that I'm not against young people trying to sail around the world at the age of 16. It's not for every young person and I'm sure those parents agonise over it, lose sleep over it and worry more than I can imagine.

Part two is where I have problems however. I mentioned above, that I think it's part of a parent's role to make sure the risks are proportional. In the most recent case of Abby Sunderland the story is interesting. I'm not trying to judge either Abby or her parents in writing this - that's not my role. Rather it's to tell you how I think about it and I'd be interested to hear how you think about it.

Two things are of concern to me: Firstly in January - mid-summer in the Souther Hemisphere - in the area where Abby has been dismasted, the frequency of gales is less than 5 days per month. In July (the nearest month with data) the frequency of gales is greater than 10 days per month, the gale area stretches further north and the extreme limit of icebergs is also further north. Not by much, but by enough to now become an issue at her latitude. So we have over double the incidence of gales and added iceberg risk. (Data from Ocean Passages for the World). Ian Kiernan, a solo circumnavigator himself, has gone on record as saying that it's not the place for a 16 year-old to be in winter. I'd certainly hesitate to go there myself at this time of year. Too cold, too rough, too windy!!

The other issue is the choice of boat. In my view, it's no accident that many successful solo circumnavigations have been in S&S 34s. These aren't modern boats, they're not extreme in their proportions and they're not fast. They are however sea kindly, strong and safe. The Open 40 that Abby is sailing is a more extreme hull form, faster, designed for fast running and perhaps not as sea kindly. There's no doubt that they are perfectly capable of circumnavigating, many have. Indeed Mike Perham conducted his recent solo circumnavigation in an Open 50. But whether they are the ideal boat for a young solo sailor is in my view questionable.

So if I had to sum all that up, I'd say I'm heartily glad that young people like Jessica Watson, Mike Perham, Zac Sunderland and Abby Sunderland are having a go. I do have some questions however about planning and timing in some of the cases.

Whatever the case Abby will have had some experiences that will nourish her soul and her spirit for the rest of her life. Good on her.

What do you think?

The Days of Christmas - Number 8 - Live to Fly Another Day

Changing subjects entirely for this day of Xmas: Human Factors in Aviation.

If I have one thing I'd like to see in 2010 it's for all of us who fly light aircraft to realise that it's us, and generally us alone who cause crashes, and then to act to fix that. It was this realisation that spurred the whole development of Human Factors and CRM in heavy aircraft flying. It's long overdue that we get the same benefit in light aviation. Sadly we still get human factors derived crashes in RPT operations. This recent crash in Vanuatu is an example. The pilot flew the Islander about 7% overweight and misjudged the aircraft's climb performance and its clearance from a ridge. Realising that he would not clear the ridge he slowed the a/c and tried to land amongst the heavy timber. The pilot and one passenger died and there were some serious injuries amongst the other pax. Weather does not appear to have been a factor.

I think that, at the initial and commercial training level, too much emphasis is placed on "human factors" such as how your ears work and how altitude affects us. Not enough emphasis is placed on decision making, situational awareness and threat and error management.

Try this: think of the last 3 aviation accidents that you have personal experience of or which you know well. Now ask yourself "what was the underlying cause of that accident?" I think it will be a salutary experience. Rarely if ever will the primary cause be structural or mechanical failure. Yes engine failures do happen. But a fair proportion of those are due to things like fuel starvation or exhaustion - both almost always down to human factors.

One recent ATSB report appears at first glance to be a structural failure. However closer reading suggests that other factors, human factors, probably played the major role.

I can't think of a single crash that I have seen or known about that wasn't driven by the person at the controls.

To understand that is really important. It means something vital for my safety and for your safety: If we are the cause of our crashes, then we can do something about not becoming a statistic. If we change the way we manage threats and errors and we enhance our own situational awareness and the way we manage situations then we are less likely to be the subject of a crash report. I reckon that's something worth doing.

If you want to explore HF further then here's a simple starting point. Google will find plenty more for you.

Stay safe and live to fly another day.

Death & Destruction - The TAIC Report

I had previously written about a crash that killed a cousin of mine and the delay on behalf of NZ's TAIC in producing a report.

On 1 October the TAIC finally released their report. It can be found here as report 08-001.

The report is a simple thing and yet it tells a damning story and has a lesson for regulators, aerodrome operators and pilots.Briefly the facts of the crash as set out in the report are:

• The C152 was on a solo flight and had departed from sealed rwy 34;
• It departed the circuit and performed airwork to the north;
• The R22 was conducting flight test operations from parallel rwy 34 grass with a student and testing officer onboard;
• The C152 returned and made a standard overhead join for a left hand circuit on 34 seal.
• As the C152 completed its turn on the "dead" side and began its crosswind entry at 1000' AGL it collided with the R22 which was on a right downwind for 34 grass;
• All required radio calls had been made. The aerodrome was not controlled;
• It appears that no avoiding action was taken by either pilot;
• All 3 occupants were killed.

What is salutary is that as far back as 1996 the potential for conflict with respect to contra circuit operations at the crash airfield had been identified. It was proposed that a modified circuit joining procedure be developed. This had never been done - for reasons that remain unclear.

In contra direction circuit operations - certainly as they are practiced here and and in NZ - the potential for serious conflict exists at two main points:

• Overhead the airfield at a height of 1500' AGL as aircraft from each circuit cross to their respective "dead" sides; and
• In the downwind position for each circuit as aircraft from the "other" circuit cross at 1000' AGL towards their own downwind.

Circuit operations are specifically designed to avoid placing aircraft in conflict with each other. However contra circuit operations with un-modified overhead joins create real conflict. They are in my view inherently dangerous, yet nobody had done anything to alleviate this situation despite knowing that it existed.

The lessons for me from this crash are:

1. Whilst the pilot of the C152 was notionally the give way pilot all pilots had a responsibility to see and avoid. This accident shows that, as other studies have found, see and avoid has serious limitations;
2. Systems of operation create the conditions within which a crash can occur. In this case the accepted system of operation created dangerous potential for conflict which remained unaddressed. So whilst the pilots had primary responsibility for collision avoidance, they were hampered in safe operations by the system within which they were operating;
3. That the various parties had failed to address the safety issues suggests that familiarity had bred an acceptance of risks which prima facie would appear to be unacceptable. Call it perception fatigue if you like but it's the reason we have regulators. They claim in this case limited ability to act. Is that good enough?

The bottom line is that there is a better way to join when contra circuit operations are taking place. I personally would never join overhead in that situation unless absolutely compelled to do so. If there is no real dead side then in my view you cannot conduct a safe overhead join. My choice would always tend to be an oblique downwind after taking care of spacing.

A history of conducting overhead joins in a contra circuit environment without incident does not mean that it is safe to continue to do so. Are your circuit operations as safe as they could be?